Employment Law: The Tenth Cirucit\u27s Stance on the Evidentiary Scope of a De Novo Review in ERISA Benefits Suits by Cassinis, Enzio
Denver Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 3 
December 2020 
Employment Law: The Tenth Cirucit's Stance on the Evidentiary 
Scope of a De Novo Review in ERISA Benefits Suits 
Enzio Cassinis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Enzio Cassinis, Employment Law: The Tenth Cirucit's Stance on the Evidentiary Scope of a De Novo 
Review in ERISA Benefits Suits, 80 Denv. U. L. Rev. 529 (2003). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE TENTH CIRCUIT' S STANCE ON
THE EVIDENTIARY SCOPE OF A "DENovo" REviEw IN
ERISA BENEFITS SUITS
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")' regu-
2lates most aspects of the administration of employee benefits plans.
Rather than addressing all of the issues encompassed in ERISA, this sur-
vey focuses solely on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit's recent decision in Hall v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of Amer-
ica.3 Specifically, this paper will discuss an issue of first impression in
the circuit: whether evidence not included in the record of an administra-
tor of an employee benefits plan is admissible evidence in a suit under
ERISA that is commenced in federal court.4
Part I of this survey provides a framework for understanding ERISA
benefits suits. Part II describes the events leading up to the conflict sur-
rounding the scope of evidentiary review in cases under ERISA. Next,
Part III of this survey introduces the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hall and
discusses three approaches circuit courts take when deciding whether to
admit facts absent from the administrative record. 5 Finally, Part IV ana-
lyzes the decision in Hall and suggests that it is appropriate on policy
grounds.
1. ERISA: GENERAL CONCEPTS AND SCOPE OF THIS SURVEY
A. Concepts: Pension Benefit Plans and Welfare Benefit Plans
Under ERISA, participants or beneficiaries of an employee benefit
plan may bring a civil action in federal court when those obligated under
the employee benefit plan breach either a fiduciary obligation or an obli-
gation to provide benefits due under the plan.6 Employee benefit plans
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in scattered sections of Titles 5, 18, 26, 31,
and 42 U.S.C.).
2. Robert Mason Hogg, Note, The Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review in ERISA Benefits
Litigation After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1575, 1578-79 (1994).
3. 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002). Hall was decided on August 20, 2002. Hall, 300 F. 3d at
1197. In order to be included in this survey a decision by the Tenth Circuit had to be made between
September 1, 2001 and August 31, 2002.
4. ld. at 1201.
5. Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). A "participant" is defined as "any employee or former em-
ployee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is or
may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers
employees of such employer or members of such organization." Id. § 1002(7). A "beneficiary" is "a
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are divided into two categories under ERISA: 1) employee "welfare
benefit plans",7 and 2) employee "pension benefit plans." 8 Welfare bene-
fit plans, whether provided by an employer or maintained through an
insurance policy, provide medical, disability, death, and other similar
benefits. 9 Pension benefit plans provide retirement income for employ-
ees.
1°
In addition to authorizing civil actions, courts generally interpret
ERISA as requiring employee benefit plans to establish an "internal
claim-review procedure."" This interpretation is based on 29 U.S.C. §
1133, which states:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary [of Labor],
every employee benefit plan shall-
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or benefici-
ary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting
forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calcu-
lated to be understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for
benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate
named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim. 12
Thus, recovering benefits under ERISA is generally a two step process.
13
First, an employee must avail herself of any administrative processes for
challenging the denial of a claim set forth in the controlling employee
benefit plan. 14 Second, after exhausting administrative procedures, the
employee may seek redress in federal court.15 Employing this two-step
process, courts generally treat ERISA benefit suits as an "appellate-type"
procedure and review a plan's administrative process 16 and record of
events with federal appellate procedures.1
7
person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may
become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id. § 1002(8).
7. Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 575, 575 n.2
(1992) [hereinafter Conison I] (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)).
8. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A); see also Hogg, supra note 2, at 1578 n.20 (noting that
"[e]mployee welfare benefit plans include health, accident, disability, death, unemployment, vaca-
tion, job training benefits, day care, legal services, or [even] scholarship funds").
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i); see also Conison I, supra note 7, at 575 n.2.
11. Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 21 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Conison III.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
13. Conison 11, supra note 11, at 21.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Employee benefit plans have "plan administrators" or "plan sponsors" who provide the
rights to notice that a claim has been denied and to review of the denial conferred by 29 U.S.C. §
1133. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16)(A)-(B), 1025.
17. See Conison II, supra note 11, at 21.
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B. Scope: Participant and Beneficiary Civil Actions
ERISA authorizes civil suit by a number of parties, including par-
ticipants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans, in several circum-
stances.18 Under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a):
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan ....
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan .... 19
Under § 1132(a)(1), a participant or beneficiary may avail herself of
both legal and equitable remedies because "[r]ecovery of benefits prom-
ised under the plan is monetary in nature, whereas injunctive or declara-
tory relief regarding such benefits is equitable in nature. ' 0
ERISA also authorizes courts to grant plan participants "appropriate
equitable relief' in § 1132(a)(3)(B). 21 However, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that monetary damages are not equitable relief as
contemplated under this cause of action, thus, greatly limiting the relief
permitted under § 1132(a)(3)(B). 22  Additionally, pursuant to
§ 1132(a)(3), ERISA authorizes a cause of action for a breach of fiduci-
ary duties to the plan.23 However, this particular cause of action does not
help a participant or beneficiary whose claim has been denied because
this relief is not intended to benefit an individual.24 Instead, this type of
action is "intended to benefit the plan as a whole.,
25
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)-(c).
19. Id. § 1132(a)(1), (3) (emphasis added).
20. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (2001) [hereinafter Kennedy I].
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
22. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1092 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-
58 (1993)). According to several federal courts, punitive damages are also generally not considered
equitable relief as contemplated by 29 U.S.C § 1 132(a)(3). See Karla S. Bartholomew, Note, ERISA
Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims in Managed Care: Asserting a New Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1146 & n.111 (1999).
23. 29 U.S.C. § I I32(a)(3).
24. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1092.
25. Id.
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Two practical considerations arise from the federal courts' interpre-
tation of ERISA. First, a participant or beneficiary is most likely to suc-
ceed in a suit under ERISA when availing herself of the protection
granted by section 1132(a)(1)(B). 26 Second, ERISA only authorizes civil
actions against plans provided by private organizations.27 Consequently,
government agencies and also a few types of private organizations are
exempt from actions brought pursuant to ERISA.28
II. HISTORICAL SETTING
A. Employer Abuses Necessitating Congressional Intervention
Abuses surrounding the administration of employee benefit plans
peaked as early as the 1960s.29 These plans provided employees an op-
portunity to set aside earnings from their jobs for retirement and, in other
situations, provided disability benefits and other medical benefits.30
However, because of the complexities involved in the administration of
these plans, many employees were left without pensions after plan ad-
ministrators failed to adequately manage employee funds.3' Moreover,
absent federal regulation of employee benefit plans, plan administrators
were not subject to any apparent standardized procedures holding them
accountable for abusing their discretion.32
B. Congress's Response
In reaction to the funding failures, fiduciary abuses, and vesting in-
equities that plagued employee benefit plans into the 1970s, Congress
enacted ERISA.33 Congress primarily sought to establish a uniform body
of law governing employee benefit plans, while seeking to prevent ad-
ministrative and funding abuses of employees.34 By providing uniform
employee benefit laws, ERISA was designed to eliminate the disparities
among the various state and local regulations. 35 The Act, therefore, pre-
empted state laws relating to "any employee benefit plan, '36 and granted
federal courts the authority to create a body of federal common law.37 In
26. Id. at 1093.
27. Conison 1, supra note 7, at 575 n.2 (noting that government plans as defined by the Act,
are not covered by ERISA).
28. Id. (listing the exemptions granted under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)).
29. See Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1136 n.29 (noting that Senator Jacob Javits initially
presented the bill for ERISA in 1967); Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell, Note, New York State Confer-
ence of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Supreme Court Clarifies
ERISA Preemption, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1309, 1320 (1996).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
31. Id. § 1001(a).
32. See Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1137.
33. Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Con-
forming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
34. Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1137.
35. Id. at 1137 & n.36.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
37. Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1502 (9th Cir. 1985).
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order to prevent administrative and funding abuses, Congress established
standards and procedural guidelines for administering employee benefit
plans.38
1. Federal Common Law and State Law Preemption
Although ERISA's language explicitly grants participants and bene-
ficiaries a right to bring a civil action, the statute itself is silent about
"important procedural aspects necessary to enforce a claimant's substan-
tive rights., 39 This omission was apparently the intent of Congress.
40
Congress did not establish specific procedures because it contemplated
that federal courts would "fashion a body of federal common law to gov-
ern ERISA suits.'4
ERISA preempts state law claims that "relate to" employee benefit
plans.42 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the vague term
"relates to" as applying to plans where there is a "connection" or "refer-
ence to" an ERISA plan43 that is not "tenuous, remote, or peripheral.
'"
Thus, in determining the outcome of ERISA benefits suits, federal judges
are not restricted by state laws.
45
2. Obligations Created by ERISA
ERISA sets forth rules affording participants and beneficiaries
rights "at the plan level" and prior to adjudication in federal court.46 Spe-
cifically, a participant or beneficiary is entitled to:
(1) a clear explanation of the specific reasons for the denial [of bene-
fits], (2) the right to appeal that decision internally with the plan ad-
ministrator, and (3) a full and fair review of the claim on internal ap-
peal. [Additionally,] [t]he courts generally require the participant to
exhaust these internal remedies before proceeding to litigation.
47
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1461; see also Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1137 (stating that
Congress met its goal of preventing abuses by "establishing standards for the administration of
employee benefit plans").
39. Kathryn J. Kennedy, The Perilous and Ever-Changing Procedural Rules of Pursuing an
ERISA Claims Case, 70 UMKC L. REv. 329, 332 (2001) [hereinafter Kennedy III (emphasis added).
40. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
41. Scott, 754 F.2d at 1502; Kennedy 11, supra note 39, at 332. A claimant asserting a denial
of ERISA benefits claim faces procedural hurdles that appear inconsistent with ERISA's intent. Id.
at 332-33. Recall that ERISA seeks to protect participants and beneficiaries from abuses under
employee benefit plans. See id. at 331. Procedural hurdles that differ from one circuit court to the
next do not create a uniform body of law. See id. at 332. Moreover, such procedural hurdles conflict
with the policy of protecting participants and beneficiaries. See id. at 333.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
43. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
44. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
46. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1091.
47. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
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The civil actions that ERISA authorizes implicate three types of ob-
ligations or duties of organizations responsible for the administration of
employee benefit plans.4a First, there is a statutory duty to participants
and beneficiaries to pay benefits provided for in the plan.4 9 Second, there
is a statutory duty whereby persons who are fiduciaries may be held per-
sonally liable for breach of "any of the responsibilities, obligations, or
duties imposed upon fiduciaries" under ERISA.50 That duty is owed to
the plan. 5 Lastly, federal common law imposes duties that are not statu-
tory.52 After an individual exhausts remedies at the plan level and a fed-
eral court finds that an employer breached a duty, the court may grant
relief developed in federal common law or as set forth in ERISA.
5
C. Judicial Interpretation of ERISA 's Language
Federal courts have struggled over the applicable standard of judi-
cial review for ERISA benefits suits. 54 Conflicting interpretations arose
even though the United States Supreme Court directed federal courts to
create a consistent body of "federal common law" to protect participants
in ERISA plans.55
1. Conflict Surrounding the Standard of Review for Administrative
Decisions
Federal courts encountered several obstacles in developing a consis-
tent standard to apply when reviewing administrative proceedings
involving employee benefit plans.56 Without specific guidelines in
ERISA, the majority of the circuits reviewed such administrative
proceedings under the arbitrary and capricious standard.57 Under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a court may only overturn
an administrative decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious or made in bad
faith, not supported by substantial evidence, or erroneous on a question
of law."58 Other circuits, however, favored the de novo standard of
48. See Conison II, supra note I1, at 14 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
51. Conison 11, supra note 11, at 14.
52. Id. Although these duties are not explicit in ERISA, the legislative intent to forge a federal
common law creates an implicit duty. See id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
53. Conison II, supra note 11, at 12-14.
54. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576.
55. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1094.
56. Id. at 1108.
57. Id. at 1108-09; see, e.g., Atkinson v. Sheet Metal Workers' Trust Funds S. Cal. & Nev.,
833 F.2d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 1987); Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir.
1985); Johnson v. Franco, 727 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1984); Miles v. N.Y. State Teamsters Confer-
ence Pension & Ret. Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir. 1983).
58. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1977). Arbitrary means "founded on
prejudice -or preference rather than on reason or fact." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (7th ed.
1999) (defining arbitrary).
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review, which allowed a court to review the record without deference to
the rulings of the administrator. 59
In support of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, sev-
eral courts likened the administrative proceedings of employee benefit
plans to those of administrative agencies. 6° Federal courts have also
adopted the standard from the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA").6 t One party supported this practice by pointing to Congress's
intent to incorporate most of LMRA's fiduciary law into the Act and to
the fact that both acts "impose[] a duty of loyalty on fiduciaries ....
However, a growing number of circuit courts criticized the arbitrary and
capricious standard.63 The circuits split over whether to apply the arbi-
trary and capricious standard when the decision-maker had a conflict of
interest and was not necessarily impartial.64 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in 1989 to resolve this divergence among the
circuits in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.
65
2. Developing a Consistent Judicial Standard of Review Under
Federal Common Law
Since the advent of employee benefit plans, courts have struggled to
find the appropriate judicial standard of review for claims asserting a
denial of employee benefits.66 Before ERISA and Firestone, federal
courts turned to contract, labor, and trust laws for standards of review.
67
As a result, courts turned to these areas of law to form a federal common
law for ERISA benefits suits. 68 It is therefore instructive to examine the
justifications courts give for preferring the standard of review of one
source to another.69
Courts used contract law to develop a standard of review for em-
ployee benefit claims before federal statutes protected benefits. 70 Reason-
ing that employee benefit plans are unilateral contracts, courts looked to
the terms of the plan to determine whether the employer had a contrac-
59. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989) (stating that the
de novo standard of review of trust law "is consistent with the judicial interpretation of employee
benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA," and that in those pre-enactment decisions courts did
not defer to the employer or administrator but decided the case "as it would have any other contract
claim.").
60. See, e.g., Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1050 (7th
Cir. 1987) (noting that "[tihe arbitrary and capricious standard is familiar from administrative law,
where it is used to guide judicial review of discretionary decisions by administrative agencies.").
61. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109.
62. Id.
63. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1109.
64. Id. at 1097, 1109-10.
65. Firestone, 485 U.S. at 105.
66. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1096.
67. Id. at 1096, 1101, 1107.
68. Id. at 1094-95.
69. Id. at 1096.
70. Id.
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tual obligation. 7' Early cases focused more on whether an enforceable
contract existed than on what was the appropriate judicial standard of
review.
72
Once federal labor laws controlled employee benefit rights of union
employees, courts began to rely on labor law for claims challenging de-
nials of employee benefits, even to non-union employees.73 Since federal
labor laws emphasized collective bargaining between an employer and
its employees, the courts began to reject the notion that employee benefit
plans should be reviewed under contract law because they could no
longer view benefit plans as gratuities. 74 Moreover, federal labor laws,
such as the LMRA, were silent about the appropriate scope of judicial
review for cases where participants or beneficiaries sued plan trustees.75
On these grounds, the federal courts developed the arbitrary and capri-
cious judicial standard of review and applied it in the context of ERISA
benefits suits.
76
After labor laws were enacted that protected employee benefits,
trusts began to serve as "funding vehicles for plan assets. 77 Further,
when ERISA was enacted, trust vehicles became mandatory for funding
retirement plans.78 Federal courts began interjecting principles of trust
law into ERISA benefit suits once plan administrators used trusts to fund
employee benefit plans.79 Under trust law, trustees may be granted, at the
discretion of the settlor,80 either discretionary or non-discretionary au-
thority.81 When a trustee is only found to have non-discretionary author-
ity, the courts generally review the case de novo.82 However, if the trus-
tee has discretionary authority, courts apply a more deferential standard
of review.
83
71. Id. at 1096-97.
72. Id. Under contract law, a gratuity from an employer does not create contractual rights that
are enforceable by an employee. See id. at 1096 (citing Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th
Cir. 1944)). However, if a contract existed courts "focused on the terms of the plan or promise by the
employer . I..." ld  at 1096-97 (citations omitted). Courts generally subject the interpretation of the
contract to a "reasonableness standard." Id. at 1099.
73. Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 1100-01.
75. ld. at 1101.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1104.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1103.
79. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1107.
80. A settlor is the entity or person who creates a trust. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (7th
ed. 1999). Significantly, under ERISA, the plan sponsor or administrator, who in essence, acts as the
settlor of trusts and the trustee can be one and the same. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1104.
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3. The Supreme Court Chooses De Novo Review of Administrative
Proceedings
In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,84 the United States Su-
preme Court held that, "[c]onsistent with established principles of trust
law," the de novo standard of review applies when courts hear claims
under section 1132(a)(1)(B).85 However, if the employee benefit plan
confers discretionary authority upon the plan administrator, the de novo
standard of review is not applicable. 86 In resolving this issue, the Court
addressed the sources of the conflict over the judicial standard of review
for ERISA benefits cases.87
First, the Court noted that the "wholesale importation of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard [from the LMRA] into ERISA is unwar-
ranted., 88 The arbitrary and capricious standard of review under the
LMRA was developed in order to provide courts jurisdiction over em-
ployees suing trustees.89 Since ERISA explicitly granted employees the
right to bring a civil action in federal court, the same standard of review
was not necessary to establish jurisdiction.90 Consequently, the Court
found the analogy between labor law and ERISA unpersuasive. 91
The Court then turned to trust law and found that several provisions
of the Act and the legislative history of ERISA indicate that "ERISA
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. 92 Moreover,
the Court noted that "[t]he trust law de novo standard of review is consis-
tent with the judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the
enactment of ERISA. 93 The Court, therefore, directed lower courts to
interpret the appropriate standard of review of employee benefit plans
based upon what authority was conveyed to the administrator or fiduci-
ary under the plan. 94 Under trust law precedent, the Court held that a de
novo standard of review applies in ERISA benefits suits where the bene-
fit plan does not confer authority on the plan administrator "to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan."
95
Although the United States Supreme Court solved the quandary
over the standard of review for ERISA benefits suits, the Court did not
address whether lower courts may review facts outside of the plan ad-
84. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
85. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. The Court limited its holding to the suits arising under 29 §
1132(a)(1)(B). Id. at 108, 115.
86. Id. at 115.
87. See id. at 108-12.
88. Id. at 109.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 110.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 112.
94. Id. at 115.
95. Id.
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ministrator's record.96 Prior to Firestone, under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review, federal courts denied litigants the opportunity
to admit evidence that had not been presented to the plan administrator.
97
Some courts favored such a rule because of practical considerations.98
Some of those considerations were conserving judicial resources and
minimizing litigation costs. 99 Further, under the LMRA, federal courts
limited the admissibility of evidence outside of the record. 00 Some
courts adopted labor law and applied the rule under ERISA. 10' Finally,
courts favored the rule limiting admissibility of such evidence because
plan fiduciaries were given "primary responsibility for claim processing"
under ERISA.1
0 2
However, in Firestone, the Court withdrew the initial deference that
many circuits gave to plan administrators.' °3 Moreover, since the Court
rejected the "wholesale" adoption of LMRA principles in ERISA bene-
fits suits, a comparison to the LMRA now seemed questionable.'1 4 Thus,
with little direction on this issue, the circuit courts have had to reinterpret
ERISA in light of the decision in Firestone.1
0 5
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON ADMISSIBILITY OF FACTS OUTSIDE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
Since Firestone, most of the circuits have faced the issue of whether
evidence outside of the administrative record is admissible. 0 6 With def-
erence to administrators moderately withdrawn, 0 7 the circuit courts
faced the decision whether to allow litigants to admit facts unheard in the
administrative proceeding. °8 Some circuit courts have opted to allow
claimants to introduce evidence outside of the administrative record. 1°9
Others, however, have refused to admit such evidence." 0 Finally, other
96. See id. at 104-05; see Hogg, supra note 2, at 1581 & n.37.
97. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576.
98. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455 F.
Supp. 816, 820 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
99. Taylor, 455 F. Supp. at 820.
100. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kennedy, 542 F.2d 52, 55 & n.10 (8th Cir. 1976); Danti v. Lewis, 312
F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
101. Kennedy I, supra note 20, at 1097.
102. Challenger v. Local Union No. 1,619 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1980).
103. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
104. Id. at 109-10.
105. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1584.
106. See cases cited infra notes 109-12.
107. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
108. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1575.
109. See, e.g., Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 789 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Luby v. Teamsters
Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1184 (3d Cir. 1991); Moon v. Am. Home
Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11 th Cir. 1989).
110. See, e.g., S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1993); Pierre
v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co./ Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1558 (5th Cir. 1991); Perry v.
Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1990). But see VanderKlok v. Provident Life & Acci-
dent Ins. Co., 956 F.2d 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1992) (allowing the district court to admit evidence where
the plan administrator failed to give proper notice and due process).
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circuit courts have chosen a "multi-factor" approach, reviewing evidence
outside the administrative record under certain circumstances."'
A. Tenth Circuit: Hall v. UNUM Life Insurance Co.
112
1. Facts
On June 5, 1993, Russana H. Hall ("Hall") dislocated her left
shoulder after falling from a bicycle." 3 At the time she was employed as
the Regional Vice President of Sales for Nova Information Systems, Inc.
("Nova")." 14 As an employee of Nova, Hall participated in a long-term
disability insurance plan.1 5 Under this plan, Hall was entitled to benefits
from the issuer of the insurance policy, UNUM Life Insurance Company
of America ("UNUM")."16
After Hall's administrative appeals to the plan administrator were
exhausted, Hall continued to experience pain in her shoulder."' Ulti-
mately, almost five years after her first surgery, Hall subjected herself to
two more surgeries in 1998.'18 Hall appealed the administrative decision
to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.' 9 At 'is-
sue in the district court was whether Hall was disabled and could not
perform her regular duties at Nova when UNUM terminated her benefits
and whether that disability continued through the time of trial and
"[could] reasonably be expected to continue for the indefinite future.','
120
The district court found in favor of Hall, citing the two surgeries under-
gone by Hall as "persuasive proof of disability."'
121
UNUM appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, asserting that the district court erred in considering evidence out-
side the administrative record.1 22 First, UNUM noted that the trial court
included depositions, medical records, and testimony of witnesses that
were not included in the administrative record. 23 Most importantly,
UNUM emphasized that the two surgeries Hall underwent in 1998 ap-
111. See, e.g., DeFelice v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d 61, 66-67 (2d Cir.
1997); Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 943-44 (9th
Cir. 1995); Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1994); Donatelli v. Home
Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017,
1026-27 (4th Cir. 1993).
112. 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002).
113. Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 97-CV-1828, 1999 WL 33485551, at *1 (D.
Colo. Nov. 1, 1999).
114. Hall, 1999 WL 3348551, at *1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *7.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *8.
120. Id. at *7. Hall filed suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) and § 1132(a)(3); however,
neither party denied that Firestone applied. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1200 n.2.
121. Hall, 1999 WL 33485551, at *8.
122. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1200.
123. Id. at 1204.
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peared to be significant evidence in the eyes of the district court. 124 This
evidence was never part of the administrative record because Hall's final
appeal was exhausted in 1997.125
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected UNUM's assertion that evidence outside
of the administrative record could not be considered by a federal court
reviewing an ERISA case de novo. 12 6 Although the court rejected a rule
that allowed a federal court to consider any evidence on review, it noted
that a district court could review such evidence in limited circum-
stances. 127 Relying primarily on case law from the Fourth Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit ruled that evidence outside of the record might be admissi-
ble in the following circumstances:
Claims that require consideration of complex medical questions
or issues regarding the credibility of medical experts; the availability
of very limited administrative review procedures with little or no evi-
dentiary record; the necessity of evidence regarding interpretation of
the terms of the plan rather than specific historical facts; instances
where the payor and the administrator are the same entity and the
court is concerned about impartiality; claims which would have been
insurance contract claims prior to ERISA; and circumstances in
which there is additional evidence that the claimant could not have
presented in the administrative process.
128
The court cautioned that district courts are not required to admit
evidence outside of the administrative record in those circumstances.
29
Moreover, the court directed lower courts to "only admit the additional
evidence if the party seeking to introduce it can demonstrate that it could
not have been submitted to the plan administrator at the time the chal-
lenged decision was made.'
' 30
In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit rejected two other ap-
proaches to the issue.' 3' One approach prohibits the inclusion of facts
outside of the administrative record. 32 The other view allows a claimant
to freely introduce evidence not previously admitted before the plan ad-
ministrator.133 The court rejected both rules because "[a]llowing a district
124. Id. at 1206-07.
125. See id. at 1200.
126. Id. at 1202-03, 1207.
127. Id. at 1202.
128. Id. at 1203 (quoting Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1027).
129. Id.
130. Id.




2003] APPELLATE REVIEW OF ERISA BENEFITS SUITS 541
court to exercise its discretion to admit additional evidence in certain
circumstances best reconciles [the] competing purposes [of ERISA]."' 34
The court gave three reasons that the Fourth Circuit's approach was
preferable to the others. 135 First, the court noted that unless it allows sup-
plemental evidence into the record under special circumstances, "we run
the risk of providing employees fewer procedural rights than they had
prior to the enactment of ERISA."'136 Second, admitting evidence outside
of the administrative record protects employee substantive rights "in
those limited circumstances where extra-record evidence is relevant and
necessary.137 Finally, the court emphasized that due to inconsistencies in
the extent of administrative records and the complex issues involved in
some ERISA cases, litigants may proffer additional evidence in appro-
priate circumstances. 38
B. Other Circuits
Hall mandates a multi-factor approach to decide whether evidence
outside of the administrative record is admissible in the Tenth Circuit.
139
In reaching that decision, the Tenth Circuit addressed the approaches of
three other circuits. 14° Because the court adopted one of those approaches
and rejected the other two,lnl it is useful to consider each in greater de-
tail.




The petitioner, Mr. Quesinberry, brought suit against Life Insurance
Company of North America ("LINA") for wrongful denial of benefits
under "an accidental death policy.' ' 143 Mr. Quesinberry's wife died fol-
lowing preparation for a procedure to confirm a diagnosis of multiple
sclerosis.'4a She was given an injection of Renografin to assist the doc-
tors read the results of a computerized tomography scan that they
planned to perform. 145 Within minutes Mr. Quesinberry's wife went into
cardiac arrest. 146 She was in a comatose state until she died on June 19,




138. Id. at 1202-03.
139. Id. at 1203.
140. Id. at 1201-03.
141. Id. at 1202.
142. 987 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1993).
143. Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1019.
144. Id. at 1020.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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1983.147 An autopsy revealed that she had neurosarcoidosis, a disease
which may have contributed to her reaction to the injection of Reno-
grafin. 1
48
Based upon the results of the autopsy, LINA refused to provide Mr.
Quesinberry with benefits from his wife's accidental insurance policy. 149
After exhausting all administrative appeals to the plan, Mr. Quesinberry
sought redress in a federal district court. 50 Here, he presented evidence
that was not reviewed by the plan administrator at LINA.' 5' The district
court concluded that under the de novo standard of review, Mr. Quesin-
berry was permitted to bring forth all admissible evidence, which in-
cluded evidence that was not before the plan administrator. 52 Moreover,
the district court found that LINA wrongfully denied Mr. Quesinberry
the benefits promised in the accidental life insurance policy.'
53
b. Decision
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected LINA's contention
that the district court erred when it allowed evidence outside of the ad-
ministrative record to be heard. 154 The court held that when "conducting
de novo review of ERISA benefits claims[, courts] should review only
the evidentiary record that was presented to the plan administrator or
trustee except where the district court finds that additional evidence is
necessary."'
155
The court then described the circumstances where admitting evi-
dence outside the administrative record may be appropriate. 56 The ex-
amples included cases involving complex medical questions and situa-
tions where the evidence does not exist at the time of the administrative
proceeding. 57 Even though circumstances may suggest that review of
evidence outside of the record is appropriate, a district court may exclude
that evidence. 158 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Quesinberry
directs lower courts to decide whether evidence outside the administra-
tive record should be admitted on a case-by-case basis. 59
147. Id.
148. id.
149. Id. at 1020-21.
150. Id. at 1020.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1021.
154. Id. at 1023, 1032.
155. Id. at 1026.
156. Id. at 1027.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 1032.
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2. The Eleventh Circuit's Inclusion of Evidence Outside of the
Administrative Record: Moon v. American Home Assurance
Co. 160
a. Facts
While taking off from McCollum Airport in Cobb County, Georgia,
the airplane in which Robert Moon was riding crashed and he was
killed. 16 Moon was a vice president of Day Realty of Atlanta ("Day Re-
alty"). 162 Day Realty provided a group travel insurance policy which
provided accidental death insurance for officers of the corporation.1
61
The defendant, American Home Assurance Company ("American"),
denied Moon's widow benefits under the policy based on its belief that
Moon was not an officer of Day Realty.164 Moreover, American asserted
that even if Moon qualified as an officer of Day Realty, his widow was
not entitled to benefits because the purpose of Moon's trip was not busi-
ness related.165 The district court granted the widow's motion for sum-
mary judgment and American appealed. 166 On appeal, American argued
that the district court did not apply the appropriate standard of review. 1
67
b. Decision
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected American's conten-
tion that the district court erred in admitting evidence outside of the ad-
ministrative record. 168 The court found in favor of Moon's widow. 169 The
court held that limiting the evidence would be contrary to the notion of
de novo review.' 70 In addition, excluding evidence outside of the admin-
istrative record would afford employees less protection than they enjoyed
prior to the enactment of ERISA.17 ' Therefore, the court concluded that
there should not be any restrictions on the evidence courts consider in
ERISA cases.
172
160. 888 F.2d 86 (11 th Cir. 1989).






167. Id. at 88.
168. Id. at 89.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113-14).
172. See id.
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3. The Sixth Circuit's Exclusion of Evidence Outside of the Ad-
ministrative Record: Perry v. Simplicity Engineering'
73
a. Facts
Max Perry ("Perry") was employed at Simplicity Engineering
("Simplicity") from 1973 through 1985.174 For roughly ten years Perry's
performance was satisfactory. 175 However, in 1982 or 1983, Perry's work
performance deteriorated significantly due to alcohol abuse. 176 In fact,
Perry was hospitalized twice in 1984 for ailments associated with alcohol
abuse. 177 Ultimately, Simplicity became increasingly unsatisfied with
Perry's performance and terminated him on April 25, 1985.178
After his termination, Perry's alcohol abuse continued and he was
again hospitalized in January 1986. 179 Perry filed a claim for long-term
disability benefits with Simplicity based on his treatment.! 8 After re-
viewing his claim, the plan administrator denied his claim because Perry
was not disabled within the meaning of the plan during his employment
at Simplicity. 181 Perry challenged the administrative decision in district
court and sought to admit vocational evidence that was not reviewed by




The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Perry's contention that
the district court erred in excluding evidence that was outside of the ad-
ministrative record. 184 Although the Sixth Circuit noted that it was inap-
propriate for the district court to apply the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Firestone,
the court concluded that the error did not warrant remand to the district
court. 185 The court emphasized that even under a de novo standard of
review, the result would be the same.
186
The court next turned to Perry's assertion that the lower court erred
in not admitting vocational evidence that was outside the administrative
173. 900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990).







181. id. at 964-65.
182. Id. at 965.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 967.
185. Id. at 965-66.
186. Id. at 967.
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record.187 Before the Supreme Court decided Firestone, the Sixth Circuit
limited evidence to the administrative record in cases where it applied
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 88 However, even in light of Fire-
stone, the Sixth Circuit found that "the de novo review required by [Fire-
stone] is a de novo review of the record before the administrator or fidu-
ciary."'189 As a result, the court concluded that it was appropriate to ex-
clude the vocational evidence.
190
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit's decision to expand the evidentiary scope of a de
novo review in certain ERISA benefits suits is a choice based on pol-
icy.' 91 When courts review evidence outside the record, they honor Con-
gress's intent to protect employees. 92 However, such a policy burdens
federal courts and increases litigation Costs. 19 3 Courts that exclude evi-
dence outside the administrative record provide more expedient proceed-
ings at a lower cost to the litigants. 194 However, this approach conflicts
with the holding of Firestone and overlooks the possibility that a plan
administrator could abuse an employee during the internal appeal. 9 5 Fi-
nally, courts that choose a multi-factor approach try to balance fairness
with prudent allocation of judicial resources. 196 The multi-factor ap-
proach is flexible; 197 yet, two circuits adopting the standard could treat
similarly situated employees disparately. This standard of review, how-
ever, is implicitly supported by the language of ERISA, the legislative
history of ERISA, and is appropriate as a matter of policy.
ERISA is silent on many issues, and the legislative history reveals
that Congress intended to grant federal courts the authority to develop a
federal common law. 198 Congress, therefore, gave substantial deference
to federal judges. Moreover, circumstances surrounding ERISA benefits
claims can vary dramatically, so judges should have the discretion to
decide whether to admit evidence outside the administrative record on a
case-by-case basis.' 99
187. See id. at 966-67.
188. Id. at 965 n. 1.
189. Id. at 966.
190. Id. at 967.
191. See Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576.
192. See Moon v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11 th Cir. 1989); 29 U.S.C. §
1001(a) (2000).
193. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1577.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 1590, 1597.
196. Hall v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 300 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2002).
197. See Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (4th Cir. 1993).
198. 120 CONG. REC. 29933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) ("It is also intended that a body
of federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and
obligations under private welfare and pension plans.").
199. Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1025-26.
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A potential rule's impact on judicial resources is often a valuable
consideration when deciding whether to adopt it.2°° However, Congress
neither explicitly nor implicitly expressed an intention to use the Act to
201conserve judicial resources. Moreover, the argument that plan adminis-
trators are "closer to the facts" and consequently better situated to deter-
mine what evidence is relevant 202 is not supported by ERISA or its legis-
lative history. Deference to plan administrators should be approached
cautiously. ERISA is primarily created to protect participants and benefi-
203
ciaries of employee benefit plans from abusive plan administrators.Relying on administrators, therefore, ignores the very purpose of ERISA.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that considering evidence outside the
administrative record "would frustrate the goal of prompt resolution of
claims by the fiduciary under the ERISA scheme., 204 In direct conflict
with the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that excluding evidence
outside of the administrative record would "require us to impose a stan-
dard of review that would afford less protection to employees and their
beneficiaries than [they enjoyed] before ERISA was enacted. 20 5
Neither the blanket rule excluding all evidence nor the blanket rule
admitting all evidence is sound. 206 Although the Sixth Circuit asserts that
judicial intervention would result in cumbersome review of administra-
tive records and frustrate the goals of ERISA, the court failed to substan-
tiate its contentions with facts.20 7 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit did not
give adequate consideration to the fact that ERISA was enacted to pro-
tect employees from the funding failures, fiduciary abuses, and vesting
inequities that plagued employee benefit plans until the 1970s.2 °8
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit's rule that all evidence outside of
the administrative record is admissible emphasizes the protection of em-
ployees, 209 but does not adequately address the problem of federal judges
usurping the role of plan administrators. This rule may prolong benefits
proceedings considerably as claims await federal review. 2  A rule that
200. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1590, 1597.
201. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4999-5001 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001). Congress was actually more con-
cemed with employees receiving inexpensive and expeditious dispute resolution over claims for
employee benefits. Id. at 4999-5000.
202. Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co./ Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir.
1991).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
204. Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990). Additionally, "[a] primary
goal of ERISA was to provide a method for workers and beneficiaries to resolve disputes over bene-
fits inexpensively and expeditiously." Perry, 900 F.2d at 967.
205. Moon, 888 F.2d at 89 (alteration in original) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,114 (1989)).
206. See Hogg, supra note 2, at 1576-77.
207. Id. at 1597-98.
208. Medill, supra note 33, at 5.
209. Moon, 888 F.2d at 89.
210. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1599.
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permits courts to review any evidence outside of the administrative re-
cord provides a loophole whereby claimants may circumvent the internal
review procedures of the particular plan.21' Finally, if a claimant prevails
in federal court and benefits are awarded, plan assets could be signifi-
cantly diminished by litigation expenses and unexpected benefit pay-
ments. 21 2 Thus, blanket rules admitting evidence or excluding evidence
do not adequately reconcile the conflicting interests in protecting em-
ployees and preventing burdensome and unnecessary litigation.
The Tenth Circuit found a solution that addresses the inadequacies
of both blanket rules. Under Hall, "[t]he party seeking to supplement the
record bears the burden of establishing why the district court should
exercise its discretion to admit particular evidence by showing how that
evidence is necessary to the district court's de novo review.' , 21 3 That bur-
den is heavy because "it is the unusual case in which the district court
should allow supplementation of the record., 214 Consequently, a claimant
who seeks to introduce evidence that did not exist at the time of the ad-
ministrative proceeding must overcome the burden of establishing the
need for the evidence.215
Employees are still protected from wrongful denial of benefits by
plan administrators under the Tenth Circuit's approach because it is still
possible for the employee to convince the court to admit evidence out-
side of the administrator's record . 6 Moreover, the interest in preserving
judicial resources is protected because the court need not sift through
additional, often sizable and extraneous, evidence if the claimant cannot
satisfy the initial burden of proof.21 7 Finally, the Tenth Circuit's rule
gives lower courts discretion that is consistent with Congress's objective
of providing guidance to plan administrators through ERISA that will
218prevent abuses of employees.
The position that the Tenth Circuit took in Hall on the admissibility
of evidence outside of the administrative record is the view the majority
of the circuits have taken. 219 The widespread acceptance and consistent
reasoning of a multi-factor approach make it likely that the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision will remain intact should the United States Supreme Court
choose to hear a case that raises the issue.
211. Id. at 1598-99.
212. Id. at 1599.
213. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1203 (emphasis added).
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 1202.
217. See id. at 1203.
218. Bartholomew, supra note 22, at 1137.
219. See Hall, 300 F.3d at 1201-02.
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CONCLUSION
Although Firestone established that the de novo standard of review
is appropriate in ERISA benefits suits, the Court's silence on the eviden-
tiary scope of review has caused a significant split between the cir-
cuits. 220 However, the spirit of ERISA and Congress's intent in enacting
ERISA suggest that the multi-factor approach is the most appropriate.22'
It is fair and just because it conserves judicial resources, yet preserves
the rights of employees. Thus, in order to remain true to the mandates of
ERISA, courts should adopt an approach similar to that articulated by the
Tenth Circuit.
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220. Hogg, supra note 2, at 1582-84.
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